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1. Introduction 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping during 
his visits in Central Asia and Southeast Asia in 2013. The BRI contains the land-based Silk 
Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). In March 2015, 
China officially released the BRI Vision and Actions (the Vision and Actions on jointly 
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road), which announced 
the formal beginning of the strategy.1 The SREB aims to link China, Central Asia, Russia and 
Europe by economic and social activities. The MSR connects China’s coast and Europe 
through a rout between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and a rout between the South 
China Sea and the South Pacific Ocean.2 As announced by the Chinese government, the BRI 
aims at building a “community of shared interests, shared destiny, and shared responsibility” 
among all the participated countries with multilateral mechanisms.3 The name of the BRI is 
inspired by the old Silk Road in ancient China. 4  The main business activities are the 
cooperation on infrastructure building, maritime and land connectivity, trade of goods and 
services, and other economic cooperation, etc.5 The BRI was proposed against the background 
of globalization and global governance.6 It delivers China’s idea of peaceful development via 
mutually beneficial relationships. On the other hand, the BRI is an effective way to transfer the 
overcapacity of infrastructure production to other developing countries who are keen for it. 
                                                          
1 The National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce, 
Vision and Action on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (2015).   
2  Lingliang Zeng, “Conceptual Analysis of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Road towards a Regional 
Community of Common Destiny” (2016) 15 Chinese Journal of International Law 517, 518-519. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ta Sen Tan, ‘Introduction of the Overland Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road’ in Tai-Wei Lim and others (eds), 
China’s One Belt One Road Initiative (Imperial College Press, 2016), 21-22.  
5 Zeng, above fn.2, 518. 
6 Ibid.  
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This aims to generate a win-win outcome for both parties. Moreover, the BRI could also 
enhance China’s cultural influences worldwide.7  
In order to facilitate the finance and funding of the BRI investment, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment bank (AIIB) was established in 2015. Since the launch of the BRI, most countries 
along the route responded positively. Currently, 84 countries have joined the AIIB and the 
membership is still open but not limited to the BRI region. The project is expanding from Asia 
to the world. 8 Non-regional countries are major participants as well.9 Until 2017, 24 projects 
have been approved by the AIIB and the total loans have exceeded US$4.22 billion.10 In 2017, 
China has signed contracting project contracts with 61 countries under the BRI and the trade 
volume achieved US$983 billion.11  
Under the BRI, particularly the MSR, China and Southeast Asia is building up a closer 
business relationship. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays an 
important role in improving the business environment for economic activities stimulated by the 
BRI. Taxation is a critical factor for almost any business activity under the BRI. Although 
enterprises always hope to prevent and manage disputes, tax disputes seem to increase in the 
long term with the expansion of the trade and investment between China and ASEAN countries. 
The prevention and resolution of tax disputes become an essential part for the business 
cooperation between China and ASEAN countries.  
                                                          
7  Jianren Lu, “The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and China-ASEAN Industry Cooperation” (2016) 7 
International Journal of China Studies 375, 376.  
8 Statistics are from the AIIB website, available at: https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-
bank/index.html [Accessed May 11, 2018]. 
9 Non-regional members are Austria, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom.   
10 Statistics are from the AIIB website, available at: https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html [Accessed May 11, 2018]. 
11 Dan Lian, 2017, the “Belt and Road” Construction Entered a New Phase from the Big Idea to the Fine 
Brushwork, Economic Daily, 8 January 2018, available at: http://www.sohu.com/a/215282594_118392 [Accessed 
May 11, 2018].  
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The mutual agreement procedure (MAP) is traditionally the major means to solve tax 
disputes derived from tax treaties. The MAP allows competent authorities of the contracting 
states to negotiate directly to solve disputes regarding treaty provisions. It guarantees certainty 
in a business environment for taxpayers. The OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) Action Plans, i.e. Action 14, has integrated effective dispute resolution mechanisms as 
a minimum standard, which aims to facilitate tax dispute resolution via MAP. Moreover, it 
includes tax arbitration as an option for willing countries. Meanwhile, the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (MLI) has also embedded the dispute resolution via MAP and alternatively arbitration 
for countries to solve tax disputes. The adoption of arbitration is becoming an increasingly 
accepted method to solve tax disputes. China has signed tax treaties with all ASEAN countries 
except Myanmar and all of them include a MAP provision. With an increasing business 
investment under the BRI between China and ASEAN, the MAP cases surge accordingly. It 
seems an effective way to solve current treaty related disputes. However, the MAP has its limits 
in effectively solving disputes considering the disparity of tax authorities’ competency, 
resource, and experience in ASEAN countries.  
On 7 January 2018, China has established the first BRI International Commercial Court-
connected and Mediation Center (the Centre) in Shenzhen Qianhai district. As an international 
non-governmental organization, this center serves for the resolution of international 
commercial disputes through mediation and arbitration, especially targeted at the area of the 
MSR. Whether or not this center could play a role in resolving tax disputes becomes an 
interesting question. A further question rises as whether arbitration is an effective 
supplementary choice to the MAP with respect to tax disputes generated under the BRI for 
China and ASEAN countries.  
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The BRI is not merely as a regional cooperation project but a globalized business opportunity. 
Although it is initiated by China, it connects mainly Europe and Asia. The destination of both 
the SERB and the MSR is Europe. Therefore, it provides European countries more 
opportunities for economic cooperation. Moreover, it implicates the global influence of China 
as an emerging power. China’s GDP ranks second in the world.12 It is not only a top destination 
for foreign direct investment but also a main capital exporting country. In 2016, China’s net 
outbound investment is US$ 170.1 billion, while the inbound FDI is US$ 126.0 billion.13 The 
outbound investment has surpassed the inbound investment. Instead of being a norm taker, 
China is becoming a norm maker in the current global order. The establishment of the Centre 
indicates that China is making its own rules on dispute resolutions for investment activities 
along the BRI. Therefore, it is inspirational for the world to have a closer look at this project, 
especially the new tax dispute resolution mechanism proposed by China. 
This article analyzes current means to solve tax disputes between China and ASEAN 
countries, and discusses the possibility and concerns of adopting mediation and arbitration as 
an alternative. It specifically analyzes the advantages and problems of the newly established 
Centre for dispute resolution. This article aims to provide thoughts on how to find the most 
appropriate and effective way to solve tax disputes, therefore ensuring a certain business 
environment for taxpayers.    
                                                          
12 See the World Bank Data GDP Ranking (2016), available at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gdp-
ranking [Accessed May 11, 2018]. 
13 Actually, China has become a capital importing and capital exporting country since 2014. In 2014, the outbound 
direct investment was US$123.1 billion, and the inbound foreign direct investment was 119.5 billion. In 2015, the 
outbound direct investment was US$ 145.6 billion, and the inbound foreign direct investment was US$ 126.2 
billion. Statistics are from the Ministry of Commerce in China, available at:  
http://data.mofcom.gov.cn/tzhz/fordirinvest.shtml, http://data.mofcom.gov.cn/lywz/inmr.shtml [Accessed  May 11, 
2018].   
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2. Tax certainty and dispute resolution 
2.1 Tax certainty 
Tax certainty contains protective meaning for taxpayers and it is essential to ensure tax 
certainty by a tax system.14 In general, tax certainty means the states of knowability, reliability, 
and calculability for taxpayers.15 Knowability means taxpayers know the law through the 
system of legality and competence rules; reliability means taxpayers can rely on tax law 
through the law’s stability, periods of validity, and procedure; calculability means there is no 
surprise for taxpayers, i.e. the anteriority rule.16  In a state-taxpayer relationship, tax certainty 
protects taxpayers’ expectation of their rights and obligations while restricts the state’s 
arbitrary power of taxing.17 Therefore, it is the fundamental character of a tax system to 
guarantee certainty for taxpayers.  
In international trade and investment, tax certainty is a top factor for both tax authorities and 
taxpayers. According to the IMF/OECD Tax Certainty Report (2017), tax certainty has a 
critical impact on the growth of foreign direct investment (FDI).18 In this era, several factors 
have heightened tax uncertainty, i.e. the increased internationalization of business activities, 
the emergence and spread of new business models, fragmented and unilateral policy decisions, 
and some rulings and court decisions, and the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) Project transition.19 A lack of clear and timely dispute resolution mechanisms and 
processes could increase uncertainty. To be specific, dispute mechanism in these aspects affect 
tax certainty: ongoing and frequent differences between the legislators and associated guidance 
                                                          
14  H. Ávila, “The Concept of Tax-Law Certainty” in H. Ávila (eds), Certainty in Law (Cham: Springer 
International Publishing, 2016), 195-196. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid. 
17 L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 124-125; H. Gribnau, “Equality, 
Legal Certaiinty and Tax Legislation in the Netherlands Fundamental Legal Principles as Checks on Legislative 
Power: A Case Study” (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 52. 
18 IMF/OECD, Tax Certainty-IMF/OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017), 
25-26. 
19 Ibid 9-10. 
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provided by tax administrations and the courts; lengthy judicial disputes resolution processes; 
the costliness of the procedures; and unpredictability of the costs of the dispute resolution 
process.20 The Report also identifies top 10 tools for enhancing tax certainty, and seven of them 
relates to dispute prevention and dispute resolution.21  
2.2 Tax dispute resolution mechanisms 
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) is the most recognized way to solve treaty-related tax 
disputes through the consult of competent authority of Contracting Parties. The main purpose 
of the MAP is to avoid double taxation. It is a key tool for taxpayers to minimize the risk when 
there is a dispute.22 Article 25 of OECD’s Model Tax Convention includes the MAP and the 
arbitration procedure as treaty-related tax disputes resolutions. The arbitration is considered as 
a supplementary to the MAP instead of a separate procedure.23 The OECD/G20 Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plans has also integrated an effective dispute resolution as 
a minimum standard. Action 14 develops solutions to address treaty-related disputes under the 
MAP and includes arbitration as a complementary option. In order to facilitate the 
implementation of BEPS minimum standards, the OECD develops an inclusive framework, 
which allows interested countries and jurisdictions to work on BEPS. Currently, 113 countries 
and jurisdictions have joined the inclusive framework implying their willingness to implement 
Action 14. Additionally, the multilateral instrument (the Multilateral Convention to Implement 
Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, MLI) also has 
provisions on the MAP and a default arbitration. Until 22 March 2018, 78 countries and 
jurisdictions have signed up for the MLI promising to improve dispute resolution.24  
                                                          
20 Ibid 22. 
21 Ibid 47-58. 
22 Ibid 55. 
23 M. de Ruiter, “Supplementary Dispute Resolution” (2008) 48 European Taxation 493. 
24  See signatories and parties to the MLI (status as of 22 March 2018), available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf [Accessed April 6, 2018]. 
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Besides the MAP, arbitration is a strong complementary tool for countries to solve tax 
disputes. Arbitration is a common way to solve bilateral investment treaty (BIT) disputes, but 
it is rare in tax treaty cases in practice. 25  Nevertheless, it is becoming an increasingly 
recognized way to resolve tax disputes. With respect to the MLI, 26 signatories, especially 
developed countries, have opted in a mandatory binding arbitration procedure.26 In 2017, the 
European Union (EU) has approved the EU Arbitration Directive27 as a complement to the EU 
Arbitration Convention28 in order to provide enforcement mechanisms to solve transfer pricing 
disputes for taxpayers. The United States (US) is always an active advocate on tax arbitration, 
particularly the “baseball arbitration”, i.e. the arbitrator can only choose between two options 
presented by the competent authorities. 29  The goal of including mandatory arbitration 
provisions in tax treaties is to let it act as a deterrent measures for treaty partners to resolve 
MAP cases in a fair and efficient way.30  
3. Risks of tax disputes between China and ASEAN 
3.1 Treaty-related tax disputes 
Treaty-related tax disputes are likely to emerge although China has signed double tax treaty 
(DTT) with all ASEAN countries (not including Myanmar).31 Except China-Cambodia DTT 
(2016) and China-Indonesia DTT (2014), the rest DTTs are outdated, for instance, the DTTs 
                                                          
25 K. Perrou, “Tax Law Disputes before Investment Arbitration Panels: Practical Experience” 56 European 
Taxation 451. 
26 These countries include Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Most signatories opted in the mandatory binding 
arbitration procedure with reservations. For more information, see OECD MLI Matching Database (beta), 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/mli-matching-database.htm [Accessed April 6, 2018].  
27 Council Directive (EU) 2017/1852/EU of October 10, 2017 on Tax Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the 
European Union. 
28 Convention 90/436/EEC [1990] OJ L225/10 Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection 
with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises. 
29 D. Rosenbloom, “Mandatory Arbitration of Dispute Pursuant to Tax Treaties: The Experience of the United 
States” in M. Lang (eds), International Arbitration in Tax Matters (IBFD Online Books, 2016). 
30 Ibid.  
31 For complete analysis on tax risks of China’s investment in the ASEAN under the BRI and details of treaty 
analysis, see D. Xu, “Regional Tax Coordination between China and ASEAN under the Belt and Road Initiative” 
(2018) Asia-Pacific Law Review, forthcoming.  
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with Malaysia and Thailand were enforced in 1987.32 Though Chinese tax authorities are 
working on the updating of DTTs with BRI countries,33 the identification of a taxpayer’s 
resident status, the interpretation of a permanent establishment (PE), and the application of 
treaty provisions are probably to trigger treaty disputes.34  
3.2 Competency of tax authorities in ASEAN countries 
The insufficient competency of some tax authorities in ASEAN countries could lead to 
inefficient resolution of tax disputes even with the MAP. The competency of tax authorities 
relates to a country’s economic development, budget, resources, and experiences, etc. Among 
ASEAN countries, the capability of tax authorities varies much, but the overall level is not high 
if compared to developed countries (except for Singapore).35 Moreover, only a few countries 
have experiences of the MAP, including Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 36  For other 
countries, especially those major BRI infrastructure investment destinations, such as Thailand 
and Myanmar, 37  the insufficient MAP experience and low capability could impede the 
resolution of some tax disputes.  
                                                          
32 Time of enforcement of DTT with China: China-Brunei DTT (2007), China-Cambodia DTT (2016), China-
Indonesia (2014), China-Laos DTT (2000), China-Malaysia DTT (1987), China-Philippines DTT (2002), China-
Singapore DTT (2008), China-Thailand DTT (1987), and China-Vietnam DTT (1997). 
33 L. Han and Y. Gao, “The Lastest Development and Prospect of Tax Treaties under the international perspective-
--Interview with Yuying Meng, Vice Director of the Interantional Tax Deputy, the State Administration of 
Taxation” (2017) 6 International Taxation in China 8. 
34 Xu, above fn. 31. 
35 According to the statistics of the World Bank in 2017, the time to prepare and pay taxes is ASEAN countries is 
long and the number for taxpayers to make tax payments is high on average. Brunei: 64 hours, 15 time; Cambodia 
173 hours, 40 times; Indonesia 208 hours, 43 times; Laos 362 hours, 35 times; Malaysia 188 hours, 8 times; 
Myanmar 282 hours, 31 times; Philippines 182 hours, 20 times; Singapore 64 hours, 5 times; Thailand 262 hours, 
21 times; Vietnam 498 hours, 14 times.  
36 See OECD MAP profile, available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/dispute/country-map-profiles.htm [Accessed 
April 4, 2018]. 
37 For instance, China has officially announced the start of the infrastructure projects on the China-Myanmar 
Railway, China-Myanmar Oil & Gas Pipeline, and China-Thailand Railway. See An Inventory of the Significant 
Projects under the “Belt and Road Initiative”, February 4, 2017, available at: 
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qyfc/xmal/2475.htm [Accessed April 4, 2018]. 
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3.3 The political economy of the region 
The political economy in this region could increase chances of tax disputes. ASEAN 
countries normally consider the BRI as an opportunity for foreign direct investment (FDI), 
which brings more tax revenue.38 Since most investment is in the construction of infrastructure 
at this stage, tax disputes could concentrate on the issues of PE identification and transfer 
pricing, which are sensitive for the taxing right. Thus, investors could encounter situations of 
no or not sufficient treaty benefits enjoyed. In addition, ASEAN countries have different 
attitude towards BRI. Some of them welcome the investment due to their keen need. However, 
some countries still maintain not a so enthusiastic attitude for geo-political reasons.39 These 
countries’ policy issues could affect the implementation of DTTs and MAPs.  
In summary, tax disputes will predictably increase in the region of ASEAN countries under 
the BRI. An effective and efficient dispute resolution system is a guarantee for tax certainty, 
which is a top factor by importance for investment.   
4. The problems of the current dispute resolution mechanism under the MSR 
4.1 The MAP is time-consuming and not final 
The MAP is always time-consuming and there is no guarantee for a final dispute resolution.  
According to the OECD MAP statistics for 2016, the average time taken to close MAP cases 
is 17 months, but for transfer pricing cases, it takes 30 months. The MAP profiles of China, 
Indonesia, and Singapore indicate that the average time to close cases varies, but it is longer in 
general. For instance, transfer pricing cases takes 26.14 months to solve in China, 39.98 months 
in Indonesia, and 54.95 months in Singapore respectively. Other cases takes 16 months, 27.9 
                                                          
38 “China’s BRI Seen Boosting Trade with ASEAN to US $2.1 Trillion”, The Star Online, May 20, 2017, available 
at: https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2017/05/20/chinas-bri-seen-boosting-trade-with-asean-
to-us21-trillion/ [Accessed April 5, 2018]. 
39 For instance, companies in Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei are concerned and resistant to Chinese companies 
because they worry the impact of competition would harm them. See Lu, above fn.7, 375. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349398 
 12 
 
 
months, and 36.05 months to resolve in China, Indonesia, and Singapore. 40 The three countries 
are relatively experienced in the MAP compared to other ASEAN countries. The tax authority’s 
competency is considered higher as well.41 It even takes these countries such long time to solve 
tax disputes, not to mention those countries in the region without much experience and resource. 
This is actually a common problem for both developing and developed countries. A main 
reason is that the MAP only requires contracting parties “endeavour” to resolve disputes instead 
of a binding resolution.42 There is no strict timetable for competent authorities to resolve the 
dispute. Thus, it could not provide a guarantee for a final resolution. Although the statistics 
from China and Singapore shows an effective resolution via the MAP, i.e. over 80% cases 
resolved, the statistics in Indonesia displays a rather opposite result, namely over 80% cases 
are finally delivered to the tax court instead of resolving via the MAP.43 Therefore, though the 
MAP can be an effective way to resolve tax disputes, it is not necessarily an efficient one. 
4.2 Taxpayers are outside the MAP  
When a dispute enters the MAP, the competent authorities of the contracting parties are 
entities who actually work on the resolution. It is a government-to-government discussion. 
However, taxpayers who are direct interest parties are always excluded from the MAP.44 
Taxpayers are merely involved to make their request before the competent authority and deliver 
relevant facts or arguments. Nevertheless, neither there is guarantee of taxpayers’ active 
participation in the MAP, nor a strict obligation on tax authorities.45 Tax authorities are not 
                                                          
40 These statistics are for cases started before 1 January 2016. There are only MAP statistics of China, Indonesia, 
and Singapore from OECD’s official website. See the MAP statistics, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/dispute/mutual-agreement-procedure-statistics-2016-per-country-other.htm [Accessed 
April 9, 2018].  
41 Xu, above fn. 31. 
42 P. Brown, “Enhancing the Mutual Agreement Procedure by Adopting Appropriate Arbitration Provisions” in 
M. Lang (eds), International Arbitration in Tax Matters (IBFD Online Books, 2016). 
43 Ibid. 
44 K. Perrou, “Participation of the Taxpayer in MAP and Arbitration: Handicaps and Prospects” in M. Lang (eds), 
International Arbitration in Tax Matters (IBFD Online Books, 2016). 
45 Ibid. 
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definitely the representative of taxpayers in the MAP, particularly when the tax authority have 
mastered all relevant information of the taxpayer. The MAP usually requires the taxpayer to 
submit all the materials related to the dispute, including the taxpayer’s revenue and loss, and 
tax payment record, etc. When the taxpayer’s own tax reporting has loopholes, the full 
submitting of materials exposes the taxpayer’s problems. The tax authority could take the 
chance to adjust the taxpayer’s behaviour or even make deals with the counterparty instead of 
completely satisfying the taxpayer’s request in the dispute.46 Moreover, the practice varies 
tremendously considering different tax authorities’ own policies. Not every tax authority 
endeavours to reach a win-win result. 47  Therefore, the MAP cannot always ensure the 
taxpayer’s requests are satisfied.  
5. Arbitration as a complementary to the MAP 
5.1 Advantages of tax arbitration 
Taking into account the disadvantages of the current MAP mechanism, arbitration could be 
an efficient complementary. As introduced before, the main models of arbitration nowadays 
are the OECD model (OECD Model Tax Convention and MLI), the EU model (EU Arbitration 
Convention and the directive), and the US model. The reason to integrate arbitration as a 
complementary is that it could address the disadvantages of the MAP.  
5.1.1 Arbitration is more efficient 
The arbitration can speed up the resolution of tax disputes. The arbitration usually has a 
stringent timeline and procedure rule for the resolution. For instance, the EU Arbitration 
Convention requires the advisory commission deliver its opinion within six months from the 
submission date and the decision be implemented within six months of its delivery.48 This 
                                                          
46 S. Li and P. Qin, “International Tax Arbitration Mechanism and China's Taxation Rights”, (2015) 5 Taxation 
Research 72 (in Chinese). 
47 Brown, above fn. 42.  
48 Article 11 and 12 of EU Arbitration Convention. The total duration of the proceedings is limited to three years.  
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setting eventually speed up the MAP settlement, which offers taxpayers more certainty on their 
expectation towards the resolution. Meanwhile, a final decision within a due period does not 
necessarily lead to a biased opinion. Reasoned opinions can be time and cost efficient as well.49 
If the arbitration system is well designed, it could ensure an efficient decision. 
5.1.2 Arbitration could provide a level playing field 
For developing countries, arbitration could provide a level playing field for the dispute 
resolution thus avoiding the power play. Compared to most developed countries with much 
experience and resource in the MAP, developing countries are in a more disadvantaged position. 
The BRI is open to investors all over the world although China is the major investor at the 
initial stage. It is predictable that more multinational enterprises (MNEs) will join the business 
activities in this area, thereby probably triggering more tax disputes. Since most countries in 
this region are developing countries with limited MAP experiences, the level playing field is 
tilt for them to negotiate with tax authorities who have more experience and expertise. This 
problem continues if developing countries and developed countries go to the arbitration, 
especially under the current arbitration models. However, an independent, fair, and efficient 
arbitration system can contribute to establishing a level playing field for developing countries 
in this region to avoid a biased resolution merely due to an unbalanced political power play.50  
5.2 Concerns for tax arbitration between countries along the MSR  
Most countries in this region do not even have many experiences in the MAP, not to mention 
arbitration. Except that Singapore and Indonesia in very few cases have an arbitration clause 
in tax treaties, other ASEAN countries do not include an arbitration clause in tax treaties.51 
                                                          
49 S. Govind and L. Turcan, “Cross-Border Tax Dispute Resolution in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of 
Existing Bilateral and Multilateral Remedies” (2017) 19 Derivatives & Financial Instruments 8. 
50  M. Lennard, “International Tax Arbitration and Developing Countries” in M. Lang (eds), International 
Arbitration in Tax Matters (IBFD Online Books, 2016). 
51 Singapore has included an arbitration clause in the Singapore-Mexico DTT (1994); Indonesia has also included 
an arbitration clause in the Indonesia-Mexico DTT (2002).  
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Within the MLI, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are all signatories, but only 
Singapore has opted for a mandatory binding arbitration.52 In fact, besides the four countries, 
Brunei and Vietnam have also joined the BEPS inclusive framework, but there seems no further 
action from the two countries to include arbitration as a means for dispute resolution.53 These 
countries do have concerns for tax arbitration.  
5.2.1 Tax sovereignty  
Tax sovereignty could be a premier concern for countries not favouring arbitration. ASEAN 
countries care more about the FDI that could contribute to the country’s economic growth and 
infrastructure construction. Every country hopes to keep the revenue in its jurisdiction. 
Submitting tax disputes to an arbitration causes concerns on harming the sovereignty. The 
existing models do not always fit in the need of countries in this region because they are all 
oriented by developed countries, and they aim to solve complicated commercial disputes. The 
design of the rules could naturally lead to “bias” towards less developed countries with limited 
experience and resource in arbitration.54 Moreover, most arbitration centres are located in 
common law jurisdictions, such as London, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which adopt the 
principles of common law as the fundamental rules.55  This is not completely suitable for 
countries along the MSR. They always concern they are not parties in the existing clubs. For 
countries in this region, the tribunal might not give a satisfying decision due to the lack of 
knowledge in this region, especially when dealing cases between developed and developing 
countries.56  Therefore, the selection of arbitrators from countries in this region would be 
helpful to increase the credibility of the decision. It is necessary to have a refined system that 
                                                          
52 Above fn. 35.  
53  OECD, Members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS (March 2018), available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf [Accessed April 10, 2018]. 
54 Ibid.  
55 For instance, the London Court of International Arbitration, Singapore International Mediation Centre, and 
Hong Kong Mediation and Arbitration Centre. 
56 Lennard, above fn. 50. 
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can protect the sovereignty of these countries thereby comforting them to accept the arbitration 
as an effective complementary to the MAP.  
5.2.2 High costs 
 The high cost of arbitration is also the main concern for countries in the region. Arbitration 
is a common way used to resolve investment disputes, particularly disputes derived from 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT). 57  A frequent complain about commercial investment 
arbitration is its high costs. The average cost for an ICSID (International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes) case is around USD 8 million per party. 58  The high cost always 
intimates developing countries who can hardly afford the expenses. However, this is normally 
the case between developed countries in the existing arbitration models. If the arbitration 
system could take into account the financial capability of developing countries and lower the 
costs, it will not become such an obstacle. 
5.2.3 Transparency 
Transparency is another concern. The decision-making process in an arbitration is always 
confidential. It is good to have secrecy on tax disputes since information involved in tax 
disputes can be very sensitive. However, the tribunal’s decision-making is not transparent, 
which means that there is no assurance on a fair and neutral determination. This could be a 
concern for ASEAN countries since they may not know how the decision is made. The problem 
is that the lack of a common standard on the application of law can lead to unpersuasive 
decisions. Thus, the lack of transparency could strengthen these countries’ concern on a fair 
and neutral result from the arbitration.  
In summary, the concerns on tax arbitration are reasonable for countries along the MSR. It 
is necessary to have better alternatives that can address these concerns if resolving tax disputes 
                                                          
57 Perrou, above fn. 25, 451-457. 
58 Lennard, above fn. 50. 
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effectively is the ultimate goal. Therefore, an arbitration system fits in this region would be 
beneficial for ASEAN countries to resolve tax disputes between them and with China.    
6. Is China’s new BRI Court-connected and Mediation Centre a step forward?    
6.1 Overview of China’s BRI Court-connected and Mediation Centre 
On 7 January 2018, China has established the first BRI International Commercial Court-
connected and Mediation Centre (the Centre) in Shenzhen Qianhai district. 59  As an 
international non-governmental organization, this centre serves for the resolution of 
international commercial disputes through mediation and arbitration, especially targeted at the 
area of the MSR.60 A characteristic of this Centre is voluntary preliminary mediation for 
disputes, which is facilitative to the resolution of disputes. 61  Although there are existing 
alternatives, such as the Singapore International Mediation Centre and the China Chamber of 
International Commerce Mediation Centre, this Centre could become a new opportunity for 
ASEAN countries to solve commercial disputes. In fact, this Centre combines mediation, 
arbitration, and an appeal procedure together. This Centre is independent from the court, but if 
disputes cannot be solved by mediations, disputed parties could choose litigation or arbitration. 
Currently, there are merely rough rules with respect to how the Centre works. There is also an 
appeal procedure if parties do not agree with the decision.62 Nevertheless, there is no clear 
guidance on whether tax disputes could be accepted by this centre.  
The Centre has a location advantage. Shenzhen Qianhai area is a free trade zone close to 
Hong Kong, which has more experiences and expertise in commercial arbitration. It also covers 
                                                          
59 R. Tang, “The Establishment of the Belt and Road International Commercial Arbitration Centre in Shenzhen 
Qianhai”, Legal Daily, 1 July 2018. 
60 “Myanmar (Burma): Experts Divided over Ramifications of Belt and Road Courts on Myanmar”, Asia News 
Monitor, 5 Feburary 2018.  
61 Work Rules of the Belt and Road International Commercial Court-connected and Mediation Centre, available 
at: http://www.ydylflggfwpt.gov.cn/web/content/108-?lmdm=1070 [Accessed April 10, 2018]. 
62 Ibid. If the case goes to the court, disputing parties can appeal to a higher court in China. This follows China’s 
domestic procedure law.  
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the region of the MSR. As the pioneer of China’s Reform and Opening Policy, Shenzhen has 
more liberal and legalized environment for dispute resolutions under the MSR.63 Therefore, it 
combines the advantages of both Shenzhen and Hong Kong with the purpose of protecting the 
rights of business parties and creating a fair and transparent legal environment.64 If this centre 
could serve for tax disputes settlement, it can be a powerful complementary for the MAP 
between ASEAN countries.  
6.2 Characteristic of the Centre: Mediation 
Mediation differs from arbitration. Mediation is always considered as an Eastern value and 
tradition, which is commonly adopted by Chinese courts. 65  It is a facilitation without 
adjudication because the mediator intervenes between disputing parties on equal footing. In 
arbitration, the arbitrator makes decision for the parties with more power distance.66  
6.2.1 Facilitative process on self-determination 
Mediation can alleviate the concern on tax sovereignty in arbitration since it is a facilitative 
process by mediators. Most importantly, disputing parties always maintain the right of self-
determination. In the process, the mediator can help to restore the relationship between 
disputing parties. If the mediator can be impartial and independent, and the process is 
confidential, this would be a good alternative compared to direct arbitration. It means that 
disputing parties can make their own choices and reach an agreement according to their 
willingness.67 This provides flexibility to disputing parties who cannot resolve the dispute in 
                                                          
63 R. Chen, “Shenzhen Takes the Lead to Establish a Belt and Road International Commercial Dispute Resolution 
Platform”, 21st Century Business Herald, 8 Feburary 2018. In the first month of the establishment of the 
international commercial arbitration centre in Shenzhen, it has accepted 274 cases, and 32 has been settled by 
arbitration.  
64 “The Central Deep Restructuring Committee Reviewed and Approved the Opinions on Establishing a Belt and 
Road Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Institutions”, Xinhua News Agency, 24 January 2018, available at: 
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/roll/45584.htm [Accessed April 10, 2018].  
65 G. Wang, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Quest for A Dispute Resolution Mechanism”, (2017) 25 Asia Pacific 
Law Review 1. 
66 D. van Hout, “Is Mediation the Panacea to the Profusion of Tax Disputes?”, (2018) 10 World Tax Journal 43. 
67 Ibid.  
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the MAP. During a mediation, disputing parties do not have to worry much about the 
sovereignty issue since the mediator is not an adjunct but a party on an equal footing who 
facilitates the process. If the mediator has much knowledge about the BRI, especially the 
culture and tradition in ASEAN countries, it will be beneficial for disputing tax authorities to 
negotiate in an open and flexible atmosphere. This is an advantage of the Centre because 
selected mediators will have more knowledge in this area. Moreover, once there are cases 
involving international parties, the Centre will select mediators from related region or with 
knowledge of the region.68  
6.2.2 Efficient and inexpensive 
The Centre tries to resolve disputes in an efficient and inexpensive way. According to the 
rules, an ordinary mediation period is 30 days, and it can be prolonged to 60 days. 69 
Additionally, the Centre encourages the use of internet-based means for mediation, i.e. online 
mediation, including video and phone meetings. The aim is to reduce the costs of physical 
meetings.70 Compared to the high costs of the existing arbitration models, the cost of mediation 
would be much lower. 
6.2.3 Flexible with arbitration 
Another flexibility of mediation is that if disputing parties are cannot resolve the dispute, 
they still have the right to go for an arbitration. A concern for China’s launch of the Centre is 
that it is “forcing” ASEAN countries to submit disputes to it, which is considered as 
jeopardizing the sovereignty of ASEAN countries. 71  Most investors along the MSR are 
Chinese enterprises, especially state-owned enterprises. These countries concern that if 
disputes between China and other ASEAN countries have to go to the court, the decision can 
                                                          
68 Above fn. 61. 
69 Ibid. If disputing parties agree to prolong the mediation period, the limitation of 60 days does not apply.   
70 Ibid.  
71 D. R. Chaudhury, “China's 'Own Courts' for BRI Rows Raise Eyebrows”, The Economic Times, 15 Feburary 
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hardly maintain neutral and fair.72 This is particularly sensitive for tax disputes. However, 
ASEAN countries still keep the last resort. Their local courts could refuse to enforce the 
arbitration decision once they find that it does not comply with local laws.  
6.3 Concerns  
Although the establishment of the Centre provides an alternative for tax disputes resolution, 
it is never perfect. At the current stage, taxation is not the focus of the Centre since its primary 
business is investment disputes, such as those derived from BITs. When tax authorities cannot 
reach an agreement with the MAP, they can consider submitting the dispute to the Centre with 
respect to its speciality in the BRI. The question is how to ensure that the system is fair, 
independent, and transparent that meets the need of countries in this region. Most importantly, 
though China takes the initiative to establish such a centre, it is necessary to embrace ASEAN 
countries to participate in the rule making. Its success relies heavily on the acceptance by these 
countries. Moreover, in this region, there are already renowned mediation or arbitration centres 
in Hong Kong and Singapore.73 Another question raises as how can this newly established 
centre compete with its peers. Mediation and arbitration are definitely not panacea for tax 
disputes in this region, but it offers a new alternative that could be refined as a means that caters 
more to the needs of countries in this region.  This Centre is just an example that implicates a 
new possibility for resolving tax disputes along the MSR. 
7. Suggestions on improving the current mechanism 
The current mechanism for resolving tax disputes between China and ASEAN countries is 
the MAP, which has its limitations. Tax arbitration becomes an effective complementary 
alternative regardless the concern over the sovereignty issue, costs, transparency etc. To better 
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
73 In Hong Kong, there are Hong Kong Mediation Centre and Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre. In 
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serving the benefits of countries along the MSR, China’s new initiative of the Centre provides 
a new model since it integrates mediation as a preliminary process for disputing parties before 
arbitration. It is predictable that a majority of disputes will happen between China and ASEAN 
countries since China is the main investor at this stage. The problem is how to make the current 
mechanism serve for tax disputes best. This relies on the improvement of the institution and 
related rules. To relive the concern on tax sovereignty from ASEAN countries, it is necessary 
to maintain impartiality of the institution and its decision-making procedure.74 
7.1 Selection of mediators and arbitrators 
    Taking the Centre for instance, it should ensure that selected mediators for tax disputes must 
have found knowledge of international taxation. Moreover, disputing parties can choose 
mediators themselves. It is necessary to have mediators from ASEAN countries, who are 
familiar with the culture, the law, and even the language. The current rules mainly mention the 
participation of mediators from Hong Kong, but if more disputes with ASEAN countries occur, 
the Centre should have a broader range of tax experts from this region. It is also important to 
have mediators from third countries. With the expansion of the BRI investment, dispute 
resolution should not only rely on mediators from Asia, but also from other countries. The core 
principle for selecting mediators is to avoid interest conflicts, which is essential to ensure 
impartiality. On the other hand, if disputes have to resort to arbitration, it has to separate the 
mediators from arbitrators for the same dispute to maintain objectivity.  
7.2 The right to appeal 
Impartiality also embodies as the disputing party’s right to appeal.75 It is often the case that 
disputants are not satisfied with the arbitration decision, especially when they have concerns 
over the impartiality of the procedure. Therefore, an appeal process is indispensable. The 
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mechanism should allow disputants submit arbitration decisions to an appeal. The existing 
arbitration models do not provide de facto appeal mechanism for disputants.76 This could be a 
novel attempt for this Centre. The right to appeal assures the party’s right to express their 
dissatisfaction, which is important for ASEAN countries.     
7.3 Transparency 
Impartiality relies on transparency of the mechanism. Mediation and arbitration traditionally 
follow strict privacy rules. There is no publication requirement for mediation agreement or 
arbitration decision under the existing arbitration models.77 Nevertheless, transparency could 
contribute to supervision of the process, which guarantees the impartiality as well. 78  If 
disputing parties does not reject, the arbitration decision could be published following the rules 
on transparency.  
In general, the Centre has to become international and professional in order to achieve its 
goal.79 The Centre does not aim specifically to resolve tax disputes, but is provides another 
option for countries along the MSR. If it can address the concerns of countries for arbitration 
and even provides efficient way to resolve tax disputes, such as mediation, it can play a more 
and more important role in tax disputes resolution along the MSR.  
8. Conclusion 
Tax certainty is an essential factor for the expansion of the investment in the region of the 
MSR. Southeast Asia is a top destination of BRI investment, and it is predictable that tax 
disputes in this region will increase considering the outdated treaty network, insufficient 
competency of tax authorities, and the political economy of the region. Thus, it is necessary to 
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establish an effective and efficient dispute resolution mechanism to guarantee tax certainty for 
both tax authorities and taxpayers. The MAP is the primary means for tax dispute resolution. 
Nevertheless, the MAP has its drawbacks including its time-consuming process but no 
assurance on a final resolution, and its exclusion of taxpayers in the process. Tax arbitration 
could be a complementary to the MAP since it could be more efficient and could provide a 
level playing field for countries in the region. However, ASEAN countries do not prefer 
arbitration for the concerns on their tax sovereignty, high costs of arbitration under the current 
arbitration models, and the lack of transparency that could lead to unfairness.  
China has established a new BRI Court-connect and Mediation Centre that seems like a new 
alternative for dispute resolution in this region. It is inspiring for tax dispute resolution. To 
address the concerns on arbitration, this Centre integrates mediation as a voluntary preliminary 
process. Compared to arbitration, mediation has its advantages since it is a facilitative process 
based on disputing parties’ self-determination. It could be more efficient and less expensive 
compared with arbitration. In addition, if disputing parties cannot reach an agreement by 
mediation, they can still go for an arbitration. Nevertheless, concerns raise on the impartiality, 
independence, and transparency of the Centre.  
To improve impartiality of the mechanism, it is suggested to select mediators and arbitrators 
with the knowledge of ASEAN countries or from these countries. Disputing parties should also 
have the right to appeal. Moreover, if disputing parties do not reject, arbitration decision should 
be published to increase transparency. Mediation and arbitration are not panacea for resolving 
tax disputes but are alternatives for efficient and effective dispute resolutions for tax disputes 
between China and ASEAN countries.    
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